Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 515, List of United States Supreme Court cases, Lists of United States Supreme Court cases by volume, List of United States Supreme Court cases by the Rehnquist Court, "Money And School Performance: Lessons from the Kansas City Desegregation Experiment", "Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989)", "Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990)". "The Tenth Amendment's reservation of nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court's discussion today, and its stated approval of the "method for future funding" found "preferable" by the Court of Appeals, is unnecessary for the decision in this case. at 111a, and that apportionment of damages between the State and KCMSD according to fault was supported by the doctrine of comparative fault in tort, which had been adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court in Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S. W. 2d 11 (1983). -281 (1977). App. [495 345 In Jenkins the Court decided that the term "reasonable attorney's fee" in the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act referred to attorney work product, and thereby included work completed by paralegals. U.S. 33, 46] Cf. Syllabus by the Court In an action under 42 U.S.C. Oct 30, 1989. may not be increased above the limitations specified herein without direct voter approval as provided by this constitution." Furthermore, if the District Court had chosen the route now suggested by the State, implementation of the remedial order might have been delayed if the State resisted efforts by KCMSD to obtain contribution. U.S. 267, 290 [495 A link to your Casebriefs LSAT Prep Course Workbook will begin to download upon confirmation of your email In assuming for itself the fundamental and delicate power of taxation the District Court not only intruded on local authority but circumvented it altogether. U.S. 33, 38]. We stand on different ground when we review the modifications to the District Court's order made by the Court of Appeals. See United States v. New Orleans, As the State puts it, "[t]he only reason that the court below needed to consider an unprecedented tax increase was the equally unprecedented cost of its remedial programs." Ante, at 57. 433 This exception also has no application to this case, where there are state and local officials invested with authority to collect and disburse the property tax and where, as matters now stand, the District Court need only prevent those officials from applying state law that would interfere with the willing levy of property taxes by KCMSD. Though the matter is not without difficulty, we conclude that the State has the better of the argument. Proc. (c) The modifications are not invalid under the Tenth Amendment, since that Amendment's reservation of nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a federal court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment. ] United States v. County of Macon, Finding itself with "no choice but to exercise its broad equitable powers and enter a judgment that will enable the KCMSD to raise its share of the cost of the plan," ibid., and believing that the "United States Supreme Court has stated that a tax may be increased if `necessary to raise funds adequate to . On January 10, 1989, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals issued an amended order, recalling the October 14 mandate and entering nunc pro tunc effective October 14 an order denying the three "petitions for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing en banc." 535 (1867), for the proposition that a federal court may set aside state taxation limits that interfere with the remedy sought by the district court. If we had accepted the State's broader, foundational question going to the magnet school concept, we could also have made an informed decision on whether that element of the District Court's remedial scheme was within the limits of the Court's equitable discretion in response to the constitutional . 102 Rather, as a prerequisite to considering a taxation order, I would require a finding that that any remedy less costly than the one at issue would so plainly leave the violation unremedied that its implementation would itself be an abuse of discretion. often used to encourage voluntary movement of students within the district in a pattern that aids desegregation. [495 Rev. 1983, the District Court found that the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) and petitioner State had operated a segregated school system within the KCMSD. Gaines v. Canada 305 U.S. 337 (1938), Missouri Baptist University: Tabular Data, Missouri Valley College: Narrative Description, Missouri Western State College: Narrative Description, Missouri Western State College: Tabular Data, mistakes you don't make anything, if you don't make, https://www.encyclopedia.com/politics/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/missouri-v-jenkins-495-us-33-1990, Milliken v. Bradley 418 U.S. 717 (1974) 433 U.S. 267 (1977), San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1 (1973). they are not unlimited," Whitcomb v. Chavis, Missouri v. Jenkins | Case Brief for Law School | LexisNexis Even though a particular remedy may not be required in every case to vindicate constitutional guarantees, where (as here) it has been found that a particular remedy is required, the State cannot hinder the U.S. 265 at 411. But it is discrimination, not the ineptitude of educators or the indifference of the public, that is the evil to be remedied. A judicial taxation order is but an attempt to exercise a power that always has been thought legislative in nature. U.S. 33, 48] A federal courts power to remediate school segregation is bounded by the nature and scope of the initial constitutional violation. [ Cf. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Id., at 1310-1311; see Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (in banc), cert. The Missouri Constitution limits local property taxes to $1.25 per $100 of assessed valuation unless a majority of the voters in the district approve a higher levy, up to $3.25 per $100; the levy may be raised above $3.25 per $100 only if two-thirds of the voters agree. Here, KCMSD was ready, willing, and, but for the operation of state law, able to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights itself. 22(a); Mo. On remand, however, the District Court held that the State and KCMSD were 75% and 25% at fault, respectively, ordered them to share the cost of the remedy in that proportion, and held them jointly and severally liable. as containing only suggestions for rehearing in banc. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT. The Court of Appeals' judgment was entered on August 19, 1988. of Equalization, U.S. 187, 196 Absent a change in state law, no increase in property taxes could take The Missouri Constitution states that "[p]roperty taxes and other local taxes . This 90-day limit is mandatory and jurisdictional. U.S. 167, 169 491 Id., at 266. [ Ante, at 57. ] The Court of Appeals also relied on Circuit precedent suggesting that a district court could order a property tax increase after exploring every other fiscal alternative. The Court of Appeals should not have allowed the tax increase to stand and should have reversed the District Court in this respect. These cases, like Von Hoffman, are inapposite because there is no colorable argument that the provision of the Missouri Constitution limiting property tax assessments itself violates the Federal Constitution. Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II), 495 U.S. 33 (1990): Case Brief 27. ] The complaint originally alleged that the defendants had caused interdistrict segregation of the public schools. On October 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals denied the petitions with an order stating as follows: "There are now three petitions for rehearing en banc pending before the Court. Ibid. App. 2. fundamental precepts for the democratic control of public institutions. 2101(c) --which requires that a civil certiorari petition be filed within 90 days after the entry of the judgment below, and that any application for an extension of time be filed within the original 90-day period -- since, while the filing of a "petition for rehearing" under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40 tolls the running of the 90-day period, the filing of a "suggestion for rehearing in banc" under Rule 35 does not. Ante, at 56, n. 20. (1989) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and so permits a federal court to disestablish local government institutions that interfere with its commands. See, e. g., Columbus Bd. to Pet. ] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New Mexico by Hal Stratton, Attorney General, Randall W. Childress, Deputy Attorney General, Charles R. Peifer, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Paul Farley, Assistant Attorney General; for Jackson County, Missouri, by John B. Williams and Russell D. Jacobson; for the National Governors' Association et al. One of the would-be intervenors filed with this Court an application for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari 78 days after the issuance of the order denying rehearing and 134 days after the entry of the Court of Appeals' judgment. Id., at 121a. The focus of their concern is Missouri v. Jenkins,' a 1990 United States Supreme Court decision. Second, the decree must indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it must be designed as nearly as possible to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct. The majority would limit these authorities to a narrow "exceptio[n]" 22Jenkins, 855 F.2d at 1309. U.S. 33, 66]. WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, and IV, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. [495 -55 (1973). See, e.g., Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Bd., 377 U. S. 218, 377 U. S. 233. for Cert. It argued that the State should not fund the teacher salary increase, and it should no longer fund the quality education programs because it has achieved partial unitary status, under. [495 . (1977), and does not afford local school boards like KCMSD immunity from suit, Mt. Footnote 12 Footnote 9 This practice rests on the important distinction between "petitions for rehearing," which are authorized by Rule 40(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and "suggestions for rehearing in banc," which are permitted by Rule 35(b). 46(c) (which provides the courts of appeals with authority to sit in banc) speak of rehearing in banc, not en banc. We held as much in Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Bd., of "magnet schools" to promote desegregation. 282 III, U.S. Const. Absent a change in state law, the tax is imposed by federal authority under a federal decree. No other order of the District Court was before the Court of Appeals. ] The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that such an injunction would violate the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. It is hereby ordered that all petitions for rehearing 446 88-1150 Decided by Rehnquist Court Lower court United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Citation 495 US 33 (1990) Argued Oct 30, 1989 Decided Apr 18, 1990 in order to fund a state bond obligation); Board of Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 24 How. 469 R-2 v. United States, The function of hiring and supervising a staff for what is essentially a political function has other complications. 103 to Pet. In fact, the taxation power is sought here on behalf of a remedial order unlike any before seen. had resigned their office no one remained on whom the mandamus could operate). Missouri V Jenkins Case Brief Case Name: Missouri v. Jenkins Case Citation: 491 U.S. 274 (1989) Supreme Court of The United States FACTS: An appeal to the Supreme Court for a case against a defendant promoting racial segregation within a school district in Missouri. 511-512. The Supreme Court majority interpreted Brown v. Board of Education as restricting only de jure segregation and referred to Milliken v. Bradley and other precedents as applying only to intra-district desegregation. Media. 1988. There is no showing in this record that, faced with the revenue shortfall, the District Court gave due consideration to the possibility that another remedy among the "wide range of possibilities" would have addressed the constitutional violations without giving rise to a funding crisis. Pet. [ [495 As the Court chooses to discuss the question of future taxation, however, I must state my respectful disagreement with its analysis and conclusions on this vital question. A federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury. [495 denied sub nom. Footnote 5 . On October 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals denied this and two. 16494. U.S. 622, 625 19 (1985). Missouri v. Jenkins, 1, of the Constitution, under which a State may not pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. Brown v. Board of Education, 122a. The plan was intended to "improve the quality of education of all KCMSD students." This case clearly reveals a Court majority attempting to place parameters around what was once a relatively broad view of a federal courts ability to cure the ills of past racial discrimination. It is true that the Court of Appeals went on "to consider the procedures which the district court should use in the future." denied, 484 U.S. 816, 108 S.Ct. Forcing citizens to make financial decisions in fear of the fledgling judicial tax collector's next misstep must detract from the dignity and independence of the federal courts. Rather than exercising what it believed to be its power to order a tax increase to fund the remedy, the court chose to impose other means -- including enjoining the effect of one of the state law provisions -- to allow KCMSD to raise additional revenue. denied, Programs such as a "performing arts middle school," id., at 118a, a "technical magnet high school" that "will offer programs ranging from heating and air conditioning to cosmetology to robotics," id., at 75a, were approved. Proc. Use this button to switch between dark and light mode. No. [495 . which to guide or review them. Get free summaries of new US Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox! [495 Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Souter, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, This page was last edited on 2 January 2022, at 04:55. It is not clear that Missouris enforced segregation up until 1954 is why there are predominantly black schools in the KCMSD 30 years later. (1943). The District Court thereafter issued an order detailing the remedies necessary to eliminate the vestiges of segregation and the financing necessary to implement those remedies. The Supreme Court argued that the lower courts had exceeded their authority in ordering measures such as across-the-board state-funded salary increases to fund continued quality education programs, which could not be sustained by local government. Authorizing and directing local government institutions to devise and implement remedies not only protects the function of those institutions but, to the extent possible, also places the responsibility for solutions to the problems of segregation upon those who have themselves created the problems. In this particular case, the State challenged two of the remedial measures ordered by the District Court: (i) State funding of salary increases for employees of the school district, and (ii) State funding of quality education programs. See Louisiana v. Jumel, 88-1150. 88-1150). able" to impose a tax not authorized by state law. U.S. 381 As a pre-law student you are automatically registered for the Casebriefs LSAT Prep Course. judicial power. See 855 F.2d, at 1314. In my view, however, the Court transgresses these same principles when it goes further, much further, to embrace by broad dictum an expansion of power in the Federal Judiciary beyond all precedent. The court reasoned that the State should pay for most of the desegregation cost under the principle that "the person The State's certiorari petition was timely filed. [495 Footnote 16 [495 The District Court concluded that it would be "clearly inequitable" to require the population of KCMSD to pay half of the desegregation cost, and that "even with Court help it would be very difficult for the KCMSD to fund more than 25% of the costs of the entire remedial plan." It appears to us that the Court of Appeals interpreted and actually treated the State's papers as including a petition for rehearing before the panel. Footnote 18 98 The District Court's school desegregation orders, which required the State of Missouri to fund across-the-board salary increases and to continue to fund remedial education programs, went beyond the court's remedial authority. The application was returned as untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. But these items are a part of legitimate political debate over educational policy and spending priorities, not the Constitution's command of racial equality. The modifications ordered by the Court of Appeals cannot be assailed as invalid under the Tenth Amendment. Some of these improvements involved basic repairs to deteriorating facilities within the school system. A second set of cases, including the Von Hoffman case relied upon by the Court, invalidates on Contracts Clause grounds statutory limitations on taxation power passed subsequent to grants of tax authority in support of bond obligations.
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